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One of the major innovations in the institutional set-up of the European Union enacted by the Lisbon  
Treaty was the establishment of an elected Presidency to head the European Council. This office was  
set up to ensure the coherence and continuity of the Council’s work. Indeed, for decades observers  
have lamented the lack of an office ensuring the continuity of the Council’s work, not least in the 
legislative  field.  The  reform  of  the  Council  and  the  question  of  a  longer  term  of  the  Council  
Presidency was also an important topic in the Convention on the Future of Europe, which laid the 
groundwork for the Lisbon Treaty. The result was, however, a hybrid. While the Presidency of the 
European Council was extended, the Presidency at the ministerial and working group level continues 
to rotate every six months between member states (with the exception of foreign policy). This change 
is unlikely to markedly increase the continuity of the Council’s legislative activities. 
Since its founding in the 1950s, the European Union1 has faced an increasingly complex legislative 
environment. The scope of its competences has increased drastically, its membership has risen nearly  
fivefold and the set-up of its legislative decision-making procedures has become more sophisticated. 
In light of the near-doubling of its membership in 2004, the Union embarked on a major overhaul of 
its institutions. Tony Blair aptly summarized a common feeling before enlargement: ‘… we cannot do 
business like this in the future’ (cited in Norman 2005: 16). Throughout the history of the Union, the 
Council of Ministers has been the crucial linchpin through which all  legislation has to pass to be  
enacted. Consequently, all discussion on institutional reform included changes to the workings of the 
Council.
Andreas Warntjen is Assistant Professor for European and International Politics at the University of  
Twente in The Netherlands. His main area of expertise is legislative decision-making in the European  
Union, focusing on decision-making in the Council.  Andreas Warntjen has published in European  
Union Politics, the Journal of Common Market Studies and the Journal of European Public Policy  
and has edited several books on the topic. He is also a member of the editorial board of the Journal of  
European Public Policy.
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A report of the Secretary-General in June 2001 on preparing the Council for enlargement commented 
on the “lack of continuity witnessed between Presidencies” due to the “temptation experienced by  
each Presidency to stamp their particular priorities on the Union during their stewardship” (Council 
Document 9518/01: 12). This temptation would increase as enlargement would increase the interval 
between presidencies of a member state: “This will lead to sharp swings in the Union’s priorities from 
one six month period to the next, with the attendant risk of undermining the coherence, continuity and 
impact of Union policies.” (Council Document 9518/01: 12). Extending the term of the Presidency to 
one year was a potential remedy that has been proposed repeatedly in this context. Even before the 
discussions on treaty change started, several changes were agreed upon to increase the continuity of 
the Council’s work at the Seville summit in (Council Document 13463/02: Annex 2). In particular, it 
made  a  number  of  changes  regarding  the programming of  Council  activities  and the cooperation 
between presidencies. The European Council would issue a multiannual strategic program (covering 
three years). In line with the multiannual program, the two Presidencies concerned would draw up an 
annual working program, including an indicative agenda for the different Council formations for the 
first half of the year. An indicative agenda for the second half of the year would be presented, after 
consultations with the following Presidency, before the beginning of July. The annual program would 
be discussed in the General  Affairs Council.  If a  dossier  would primarily be discussed during the 
following  Presidency  term,  a  member  state  could  take  over  the  chairmanship  of  working  parties 
concerned  with  that  particular  dossier  in  the  six-month  period  preceding  its  term  in  office.  The 
presidency was charged with ensuring the smooth conduct of Council session and for that purpose 
could limit the time of speakers, set the order of speakers, ask delegations to present their proposals in 
writing before a given date and ask delegations to prepare a joint proposal if their positions were 
similar or close. The debate in the Convention on the Future of Europe also took up the issue of  
ensuring continuity in the work of the Council.  The option of extending the term of office of the  
Council  Presidency  was  discussed,  but  due  to  concerns  regarding  the  equality  of  member  states 
ultimately rejected  (Bunse,  Magnette,  and Nicolaidis 2005).  Instead,  the new office  of an elected 
President  of  the  European  Council  was  adopted  in  the  Lisbon Treaty  while  the  rotating  Council 
Presidency  stayed  in  place.  A previous  innovation  -  implemented  by  a  change  of  the  rules  of  
procedures in 2006 - was also adopted in a declaration annexed to the Lisbon Treaty, namely the team 
presidencies of three member states, covering an eighteen month period. 
There is broad agreement in the literature that the Council Presidency provides the member state that 
is holding it with an opportunity to press policy initiatives and influence decision outcomes, subject to 
some constraints (Dinan 1999: 241; Hix 1999: 66; Kirchner 1992: 80 and 86; Peterson and Bomberg 
1999: 34-5; Schout 1998; Sherrington 2000: 41; Westlake 1999: 46-7 and 63). By deciding on the 
format, frequency and content of (formal and informal) meetings the Presidency might be able to 
prioritize  topics  (Kirchner  1992:  90-1  and  106;  Tallberg  2003,  2004).  Within  the  meetings  the 
Presidency can fast-track items by going into bilateral talks (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 147) 
or use indicative votes to put pressure on recalcitrant member states  (Westlake and Galloway 2004: 
41). The Presidency’s clout is constrained by the effects of external events, the need for consensus (or  
a  sufficient  majority)  to adopt  laws,  the limited time span of its  term in office  and the on-going 
legislative programme (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 146; Wallace 1985: 14-5). Consequently, 
the Council Presidency sets priorities and – to some extent - manages to steer the legislative agenda 
according to its own national priorities (Tallberg 2006: Ch. 4; Warntjen 2007). For example, the end-
of-life car directive did not make any progress during the German Presidency in 1999 and discussions 
on the working-time directive were put on hold during the British Presidency in 2005 (Bunse 2009: 
49-51).  The  Council  Presidency  can  also  increase  the  effectiveness  of  negotiations  by  providing 
leadership.  It  can steer negotiations by deciding on the frequency and format of meetings,  giving 
impetus to stalled negotiations and orchestrating events to push recalcitrant member states towards an 
emerging compromise. Presidency proposals can serve as focal points  (Schelling 1960: 70) and the 
Presidency  can  act  as  an  “honest  broker”  in  negotiations  receiving  private  information  from  all  
bargaining  parties  to  work  out  a  compromise  acceptable  to  all  (Hopmann  1998:  232-3;  Lax  and 
Sebenius  1986:  172-3).  A discontinuity  of  leadership in negotiations  inevitably leads  to a  loss  of 
momentum. Some progress is lost even in a well-prepared hand-over of the leadership. In the best 
circumstances, this  only leads to a barely noticeable delay. However, if  the hand-over occurs in a 
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critical  phase  of  negotiations  it  can  have  a  major  impact.  Furthermore,  the  prospect  of  a  new 
Presidency taking over soon diminishes the impact of the current Presidency. While this might not 
have a crucial impact on routine matters, it would affect the progress of controversial or technically  
complex dossiers. In contrast, if several Presidencies share a priority and thus if increased attention is  
given to a dossier for an extended period of time, progress is possible even for previously gridlocked 
dossiers (Warntjen 2012). 
The Lisbon Treaty adopted a hybrid. A longer term President was adopted for the European Council,  
whereas the six-monthly rotation continues at the level of the Council.  The European Council,  by 
virtue of its composition of the heads of governments, has from its very inception acted as the final 
arbiter and as the forum which could give broader political impetus to the Union. The Lisbon Treaty 
has codified and further strengthened this role. The elected Presidency, covering at least a 2 ½ year 
period, can also give its work more coherence and continuity (Blavoukos, Bourantonis, and Pagoulatos 
2007). One should note, however, that the actual powers of the new office are not clearly defined in 
the treaty and will  only develop over time. Furthermore, changes to the working of the European 
Council are more likely to affect the topics that are decided in an intergovernmental manner at the 
European  Council  itself,  but  not  necessarily  all  legislative  proceedings  in  the  supranational  area 
(Monar  2005:  212-4).  At  the  level  of  the  ministerial  and  working  group  meetings,  where  the 
negotiations on legislative dossiers take place for the most part, the system of half-yearly rotation  
continues. A substantial proportion of legislative dossiers, however, are not decided upon in half a year  
(see Table 1). Overall, about 40 per cent of legislative dossiers are discussed for more than six months 
in the Council.  In fact,  less than 15% of directives are decided upon in six months. And nearly a 
quarter take more than 2 years to resolve. Thus, a substantial amount of legislative dossiers are not 
concluded within the term of a single Presidency.
Table 1: Duration of Council Decision-Making
½ Year 1 Year 1 ½ Years 2 Years More Sum
Decision 2,393
(51%)
933
(20%)
232
(5%)
113
(2%)
1,013
(22%)
4,684
(100%)
Directive 263
(13%)
261
(13%)
151
(7%)
181
(9%)
1,197
(58%)
2,053
(100%)
Regulation 6,188
(70%)
919
(10%)
249
(3%)
145
(2%)
1,377
(16%)
8,878
(100%)
Sum 8,844
(57%)
2,113
(14%)
632
(4 %)
439
(3%)
3,587
(23%)
15,615
(100%)
Source: Häge (2010), own calculations
Joint  (multi-)annual  working  programs  and  team  presidencies  can  ameliorate  but  not  entirely 
overcome the negative effects of this discontinuity of leadership in the Council. A consequence of the 
requirement of having to draw up a joint  program is a closer cooperation between the respective  
presidencies in their preparation. For example, as part of their preparation for their presidencies in  
2006, the Austrian and Finnish governments organized a symposium in Vienna April 2005, as well as 
several follow-up meetings, to coordinate their priorities. According to a Finnish civil servant, Finland 
did not have a pre-defined set of national priorities in the legislative sphere but was mainly trying to  
advance dossiers that  were ripe for decision in line  with a common European interest  (interview, 
Finnish civil servant, 24 May 2012). However, the provisions on closer cooperation are no guarantee 
for smooth proceedings as it very much depends on the interests of the actors involved. For example,  
the relationships within the trio of France, the Czech Republic and Sweden in 2007/8 are reported to 
have been strained due to the attempts of the French to dominate the group and the skeptical position 
of  some  actors  and  the difficult  domestic  politics  in  the  Czech  Republic  at  that  time.  Similarly,  
according to German and Slovenian civil servants, Portugal was only contributing to a limited degree 
to the efforts of having a coherent 18-month program which would then be implemented as a team 
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effort (Batory and Puetter 2011: 8). What the (multi)annual programs are meant to do is very much up 
to the interpretation of the actors involved in drafting them. A Portuguese civil servant, discussing the  
potential  of  team presidencies  in  2005,  described  joint  programs as  an  “eclectic  list”  of  national 
priorities (interview, 22 June 2005). In contrast, civil servants involved in the Spanish, Belgian and 
Hungarian Trio in 2010/11 highlighted the joint  aspect  of  their  adjacent  presidencies  (Batory and 
Puetter 2011: 9). The provision on taking over the chairmanship of a working group prior to the start 
of  the  Presidency  term  has  not  been  formally  invoked  so  far  (personal  communication,  General 
Secretariat, Council of the European Union, 31 May 2012). However, on some dossiers there has been 
a more informal “flexible change-over” in terms of the leadership of particular working groups in 2006 
(interview, Finnish civil servant, 30 May 2012). 
The continuity of the work in the Council has been a concern throughout the history of the Union. A 
longer term Council Presidency was repeatedly discussed as a possible remedy. The Lisbon Treaty,  
however, established a more permanent leadership for the European Council but not for the Council,  
where  legislative  decisions  are  taken.  Whether  or  not  closer  cooperation  between  the  Council  
Presidencies in the form of team presidencies can ensure coherence and continuity in the legislative 
work of the Council remains to be seen. The experience so far is mixed as the success of the multi-
annual programs very much depends on the willingness of the involved member state governments. 
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